From John McDowell, Mind and World (1994), pp. 77-78:
It can seem that we must be picturing the space of reasons as an autonomous structure – autonomous in that it is constituted independently of anything specifically human, since what is specifically human is surely natural (the idea of the human is the idea of what pertains to a certain species of animals), and we are refusing to naturalize the requirements of reason. But human minds must somehow be able to latch on to this inhuman structure. So it looks as if we are picturing human beings as partly in nature and partly outside it.
[Kant is getting excited! But hold on:]
But there is a way out. We get this threat of supernaturalism if we interpret the claim that the space of reasons is sui generis [“its own kind of thing”] as a refusal to naturalize the requirements of reason. But what became available at the time of the scientific revolution is a clear-cut understanding of the realm of law, and we can refuse to equate that with a new clarity of nature. This makes room for us to insist that spontaneity is sui generis, in comparison with the realm of law, without falling into the supernaturalism of rampant platonism.
So I can be a good naturalist simply by rezoning?