Philosophy students are typically taught the wrong lesson from the great Scottish skeptic David Hume. The standard story goes something like this. British empiricists like Locke and Berkeley wanted to connect everything we know to what we experience through the senses. The welcome consequence of this strategy is that all the stuff we see and interact with stays known – but the spooky invisible stuff, ranging from magical spirits to substantial forms and other metaphysical clutter, all goes by the wayside. But (the story continues) Hume pointed out that this strategy ends up far more corrosive than anyone expected: for, if we hold our beliefs to what we actually experience, we shall have no knowledge of causality. We see one event, and another; but never do we experience the metaphysical glue that connects the two, and forces the second event to follow the first.
-
Recent Comments
Richard Taylor on Approximating post-modernism Huenemann on A fuller explanation Huenemann on A fuller explanation Richard Taylor on A fuller explanation jackleo on A fuller explanation
Huenemanniac 
Maybe Hume was trying to put Certainty in its place (similar to Wittgenstein in On Certainty). Instead of “Woohoo, I’m certain about that!”, “Whoops, turns out I’m certain.” I like to think of my certainties as unsightly birthmarks.
LikeLike