Metaphysical musings
-
Kantian philosophy, part 5: what to do about space
The invention or discover of non-Euclidean geometry really messed up philosophers’ claims to apriori knowledge. For centuries, philosophers were sure that claims like, “The angles of a triangle are equal to two right angles” are paradigmatically clear examples of apriori truths. But these claims are false in any geometry other than Euclid’s, as has been Continue reading
-
Kantian philosophy, part 4: whether our fixed paradigm is natural
In the previous posts, I’ve been pursuing the idea that our ability to understand experience – interpret it and offer explanations and justifications – requires making a Kantian move: we should postulate some structure inherent to our minds that formats experience and makes our understanding of it possible. I have also argued that this Kantian Continue reading
-
Kantian philosophy, part 3: from thin to thick Kantianism
The central claim in Kant’s philosophy is that our experience is somehow formatted by the nature of our understanding. Why think this is so? In part 2, I made a general case for thinking that humans are special in that we can understand – we can explain and offer justifications. We misunderstand and get many Continue reading
-
Kantian philosophy, part 2: why be interested
In part 1, I gave a quick description of Kant’s epistemological project: to uncover what might be called the human “operating system,” or the fixed interpretive framework humans employ in encountering and understanding experience. I also made a couple of brief arguments for thinking that this project is not an exercise in psychological or historical Continue reading
-
On Kantian philosophy, part 1: Kant’s project (in the CPR)
As the title of this post suggests, I’m intending to write several posts reflecting on Kant’s philosophy. I’m doing this because I have a distant goal of writing a book arguing that Kant was essentially right. In the Critique of Pure Reason, Kant had essentially two goals: first, to provide a broad explanation of our Continue reading
-
Taking out Hume’s appendix
Just returned from the Central APA which was wonderfully and surprisingly rejuvenating. In the past I have found such conventions numbing, but this time – and maybe ’twere just my ‘tude – I found a lot of nourishment at this one. (Also more general nourishment in the French Quarter.) One of my professional obligations was Continue reading
-
Ruh roh!
From John McDowell, Mind and World (1994), pp. 77-78: It can seem that we must be picturing the space of reasons as an autonomous structure – autonomous in that it is constituted independently of anything specifically human, since what is specifically human is surely natural (the idea of the human is the idea of what Continue reading
-
McDowellian idealism
A colleague of mine took pity on my flailing about in the churning waters of idealism and recommended that I read some John McDowell. Though I try to read a lot, I always find myself astonished at having missed out on things, and that’s the case here. McDowell’s Mind and World starts with an argument, Continue reading
-
True or false quiz
Once upon a time, in an otherwise empty universe, there were two notebooks, a fox, and a little prince. The fox clawed at some mud with its paws (oh yeah – there was some mud, too) and filled the first notebook with muddy paw prints. The little prince thought up many fine jokes and wrote Continue reading
-
More on idealism
(No, not “moron idealism,” though that may be more apt.) I am growing increasingly sure that idealism is true. Not “Irish idealism”, which is the view that only perceptions exist, but “Graeco-germanic idealism”, which is the view that the things that ultimately exist are ideal: ideas, forms, essences, concepts. My guiding thought is this: the Continue reading
-
My own neo-kantianism
To start, let me rehearse Kant’s basic move in explaining our knowledge of the world. Most of us will accept that there are some things we can learn only through experience (like how many donkeys are now in my yard) and some things that are simply true by definition (like anyone with an uncle has Continue reading
-
The party-pooper principle
The more I think about it, the more I am inclined to adopt the following operational principle: THE PARTY-POOPER PRINCIPLE: Given two, roughly-equal theories, the one that is less attractive is more likely to be true. Theories can be attractive in a variety of ways. Some theories meet deep-seated wishes, like the wish for immortality, Continue reading
-
Kolakowski, “The priest and the jester”
Leszek Kolakowski published an essay in 1959 entitled “The priest and the jester.” In the article, he claims that the question of “whether eschatology is possible” is a crucial one. “Eschatology” is usually regarded as a subject in theology, where it is the study of the goals and ends of human history, or the goals Continue reading
-
How time could be an illusion
So suppose you stumble across a packet of four index cards. They read as follows: #1: “At E there is evidence of M, L, F, and D” #2: “At M there is evidence of D and F” #3: “At G there is evidence of D, E, L, and M” #4: “At T there is evidence Continue reading
-
Spinoza, Einstein, Tillich
… but for now let us try to understand the broader implication of Spinoza’s concept of God. The implication is fully illustrated in an interaction between Albert Einstein and the theologian Paul Tillich at a conference on science, philosophy, and religion in 1940. Einstein criticized traditional religious views as being rooted in childish and superstitious Continue reading
-
Some metaphysical musings
I. The patchy universe It has been some weeks since I realized what a dramatic assertion it is to claim that every event in the universe is determined in some fixed way by laws of nature and antecedent conditions. True, in the normal course of our experiments, we do not see causal determinism violated (setting Continue reading
-
Strawson, Selves
I’ve been on “spring break” the past week, which has featured many delights, including a trip with my daughter to Preston, ID (where we dined on Arctic Circle burgers and then drove back home). A separate delight has been reading Galen Strawson’s Selves. His aim is to understand what selves would be, and whether any Continue reading
-
Clothes maketh the man
Actually, you should go to YouTube, find ChurchofBlow, and watch everything. Continue reading
-
Strawson & narrativity
Here is a thesis to consider: “One sees or lives or experiences one’s life as a narrative or story of some sort, or at least as a collection of stories.” Call it Narrativity. Many philosophers think the claim is true, and should be true (C. Taylor and A. MacIntyre, prominently). Some have thought it is Continue reading
-
A bit more about Strawson’s materialism
In thinking about it further, I realized my electric blanket metaphor for Strawson’s materialism is misleading. As an analogy, it is better suited for so-called property dualists, who believe that some matter can have properties which are in an important sense immaterial (like “feeling joy” or “hearing C#”). Strawson, in contrast, wants to enlarge or Continue reading
-
On ‘giving talks’
When philosophers ‘give talks,’ or ‘give papers,’ that usually means one or the other of a few things: they read a paper aloud (most often), they read some and discuss some, they have a Powerpoint presentation, or they have a lengthy handout that they work through with the audience. Very rarely do they show up Continue reading
-
Ladyman and Ross, Every Thing Must Go
I recently finished this book, which aims at correcting current ways of doing metaphysics by insisting that metaphysicians take seriously what contemporary physics tells us about the world. The problem is that “many” (I guess) contemporary metaphysicians suppose that the world, ultimately, is composed of tiny, billiard-ball like particles, which bang in to each other, Continue reading
-
The phenomenology of trying to do philosophy while in the middle of a semester
It’s like this. You’re really hungry for beans. But first you need to wash the pot. But then you need a sponge — where is it? Then the phone rings. It’s the guy who took your sponge. Why did he take the sponge, and why is he calling to tell you? Rats, the water is Continue reading